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This paper examines to what extent the shale revolution in the United States (US) and the 
new US position in the global energy market has impacted the European Union’s (EU) gas 
market and energy relationship with Russia. Making use of an analytical framework to 
study energy interdependence, the paper notes that the EU has long promoted a liberal 
view of energy trade, founded on economic cooperation and market rules. On the 
contrary, Russia and the US have tended to adopt a realist perspective, whereby energy 
is viewed as a strategic asset that can be used to achieve geopolitical gains. Moscow, in 
particular, has been accused of using gas as a weapon to achieve geopolitical gains. 
The study finds that US liquefied natural gas (LNG) coming to the market as of 2019 has 
generated an oversupply and strengthened the position of EU buyers vis-à-vis the Russian 
Gazprom. Moreover, the innovative features introduced by US LNG have to some extent 
de-politicized the gas business and made the EU’s market-oriented, liberal approach 
more effective. The paper concludes that due to today’s abundance of gas supply 
options and to the increasing competitiveness of renewable alternatives to natural gas, 
the success of US LNG in Europe will depend both on its price competitiveness and on 
whether the Biden Administration will succeed in reducing the greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with US LNG and make it compatible with the objectives of the European 






Introduction: The shifting geopolitics of gas in the European Union 
 
Ever since the first Siberian gas molecules started flowing westward in the late 1960s, 
Europe’s energy relationship with its biggest Eastern neighbour has been remarkably 
stable.1 Gas trade between the Soviet Union and Western European countries remained 
indeed impervious to the geopolitical tensions of the Cold War, also surviving the 
dissolution of the Eastern bloc and the repeated crises between Moscow and its former 
satellite states. Today, Russia is an indispensable energy partner for the EU and covers 
around 44% of its natural gas imports.2 
 
The United States (US) has never been a bystander in Europe’s energy affairs and, 
interestingly, for a long time has posed the most serious challenge to the Europe-Russia 
energy relationship. Since the 1960s, US Administrations have been wary of Europe’s 
dependence on Russian gas as they believed that it rendered European countries 
inclined to simultaneously appease Moscow’s aggressive diplomacy while being less 
responsive to American interests and concerns. As European countries increased their 
dependency on Soviet hydrocarbons, successive US Administrations deployed a vast 
array of economic and diplomatic tools to weaken Moscow’s foothold in Europe’s gas 
import portfolio and to convince European allies to limit their supplies of Russian gas. 
However, the US incapacity to provide a real competitive alternative to Russian gas 
supplies, combined with Western Europe’s need of ample and stable gas supplies to back 
up its rapid economic growth, have long prevented a successful US energy diplomacy 
vis-à-vis Europe.  
 
During the last two decades, however, the geopolitics of European gas has evolved in 
ways that might relaunch the US role in Europe’s gas supply. EU-Russia gas trade, long 
seen positively in Western European political circles, has come under intense scrutiny.3 The 
EU-Russia gas relationship has indeed suffered from the repercussions of the degradation 
of the broader partnership. The EU’s enlargements to new members highly sceptical of 
                                                 
1 In this paper the term Europe refers to the member states of the European Union (EU) as a whole, 
while specific reference will be made to EU institutions where necessary.  
2 Eurostat, “EU Imports of Energy Products – Recent Developments”, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/46126.pdf (2/12/2020).   
3 Khrushcheva, Olga & Maltby Toman, “Evolutions and Revolutions in EU-Russia Energy Relations”, 
in Claire Dupont & Sebastian Oberthür (eds.), Decarbonization in the European Union: Energy, 
Climate and the Environment, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 201-221. 
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any political and economic engagement with Russia, combined with Moscow’s 
increasingly assertive and revisionist foreign policy in the post-Soviet space, have 
transformed Russian gas into Europe’s most divisive commodity,4 with supply 
diversification gradually becoming a crucial objective of the EU’s external energy policy.  
 
In this context, the North American ‘shale revolution’ was seen by many as a potential 
game-changer. This combination of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques 
that in the last decade has enabled the US to increase its oil and gas output by almost 
60% has led policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to consider US exports of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) a potential tool to reshape the geopolitics of gas in Europe, notably by 
promoting US LNG to displace Russian supplies.  
 
Against this backdrop, this paper examines to what extent the exceptional surge in US 
domestic gas production has reshaped the global gas industry and impacted the EU-
Russia gas relationship. It also aims to contribute to the debate on the EU’s actorness in 
external energy policy. It has been argued that the EU, when dealing with actors inspired 
by realist thinking, finds it necessary to compromise on its liberal paradigm to safeguard 
its internal market.5 In fact, in the context of the Europe-Russia relationship, the European 
Commission has often stepped in to supplement its regulatory toolbox with diplomacy 
and exemptions to open market rules.6 Against this backdrop, the paper argues that 
American LNG has contributed to render natural gas less susceptible to political 
manipulation as it strengthened the position of EU buyers vis-à-vis the Russian Gaszprom. 
In this changed energy landscape, the EU’s traditional regulatory toolbox is more 
effective in ensuring security of gas supply.  
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: The first part introduces the analytical 
framework which draws on two different competing perspectives inspired respectively by 
the realist and liberal schools of thought. Throughout the paper, this framework will be 
used as an interpretative lens to analyse the positions of the different actors involved in 
the EU-Russia energy equation, notably the EU member states, the Russian government 
                                                 
4 Buck, Tobias, “How Russian Gas Became Europe’s Most Divisive Commodity”, Financial Times, 
16/07/2018, https://www.ft.com/content/e9a49e8c-852c-11e8-a29d-73e3d454535d, (20/2/2020).  
5 Goldthau, Andreas & Nick Sitter, “A Liberal Actor in a Realist World? The Commission and The 
External Dimension of the Single Market for Energy”, Journal of European Public Policy, 21:10, 2014, 
pp. 1452-1472. 
6 Ibid.  
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and the US. Second, it analyses the EU-Russia energy relationship and its evolution over 
time, including Europe’s changing perception of the energy relationship with Moscow. 
The third part analyses the American perspective on the Europe-Russia energy 
interdependence and the US involvement in Europe’s energy affairs. The last part of the 
paper examines the geoeconomics of US LNG exports and the extent to which they have 
affected the global geopolitics of gas and the EU-Russia energy relationship. The 
conclusions summarize the findings of the paper and provide a brief outlook into the 
future.  
 
Analytical framework  
 
Different theories of International Relations have inspired different conceptualizations of 
energy security. Whereas realism sees energy as a strategic tool states employ to serve 
their national interests to the detriment of others, liberalism allows for the possibility of win-
win cooperation and the role of international bodies in fostering global energy 
cooperation.7  
 
According to the realist school of thought, international relations are characterized by 
anarchy, distrust and the ever-present prospect of war.8 Energy resources can thus trigger 
inter-state rivalry, strategic competition and, ultimately, military conflict.9 For realists, 
interdependence is a potential source of conflict between nations, an instrument through 
which states fight wars, a weapon that can be used by suppliers to achieve political 
gains.10 In this geopolitical understanding, “the struggle for energy is subsumed under the 
‘normal’ competition for power, survival, land, valuable materials or markets”11 and 
energy resources represent a tool for resource-rich nations to uphold their strategic 
                                                 
7 Stoddard, Edward, “Reconsidering the Ontological Foundations of International Energy Affairs: 
Realist Geopolitics, Market Liberalism and a Politico-Economic Alternative”, European Security, 
22:4, 2013, pp. 437-463.  
8 Williams, Paul D., Security Studies: An Introduction, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 3-34. 
9 Hamon, David & Arnold Dupuy, “Security of Energy: The Conflict After Next?”, Strategic Insights 
7:1, 2008.  
10 Belkin, Paul, “The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges”, Congressional Research Service 
Report, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 4; Bolton, Paul, Donna Gore & Ruth Winstone, “Energy Security”, 
UK House of Commons Research Paper, 07:42, 9 May 2007, p. 1; Yergin, Daniel, “Ensuring Energy 
Security”, Foreign Affairs, 85:2, 2006, pp. 69-82.   
11 Ciută, Felix, “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?”, Security Dialogue, 
41:2, pp. 123-144.  
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interests in the global system.12 States’ security depends on their ability “to control what 
they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency on others”.13 Accordingly, 
nations should avoid relying on foreign suppliers14 and seek energy self-sufficiency to 
reduce imported foreign resources to the minimum.15  
 
On the contrary, liberal approaches stress the existence of potential absolute gains 
stemming from energy interdependence. They emphasize the role markets and 
institutions can play in promoting win-win cooperation in the international energy 
landscape.16 From the liberal viewpoint, energy security is determined by market forces, 
i.e. supply and price.17 Threats to energy security do not stem from supplier states’ 
malicious intentions but are rather the product of market failures.18 Under the liberal 
paradigm, not just energy relations but economic exchanges and trade at large have 
the potential to promote cooperation, shape common goals and constrain states’ 
geopolitical ambitions.19  
 
In the following sections of this paper, these opposite perspectives on energy 
interdependence will be used to analyse the different actors’ positions. Western 
European countries have long believed that gas trade with Russia could be a tool to 
defuse tensions and create incentive for cooperation. On the contrary, Eastern European 
countries and the US see energy dependence on Russia as an inherent vulnerability and 
stress that Moscow’s reckless foreign policy makes it an unreliable energy partner.  
 
                                                 
12 Stoddard, op. cit.  
13 Waltz, Kenneth, “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power”, in Neorealism and its Critics, Robert 
Keohane (ed.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 103; Casier, Tom, “The Rise of Energy 
to the Top of the EU-Russia Agenda: From Interdependence to Dependence?”, Geopolitics, 16:3, 
2011, pp. 536-552.  
14 Luft, Gal & Anne Korin, Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook, 
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009, p. 340.  
15 Collins, Alan, Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 47-348.  
16 Goldthau, Andreas & Jan Martin Witte, “The Role of Rules and Institutions in Global Energy: An 
Introduction”, in Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game, Andreas Goldthau & 
Jan Martin Witte (eds.), Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, pp. 1-22.  
17 Chester, Linne, “Conceptualizing Energy Security and Making Explicit its Polysemic Nature”, 
Energy Policy, 38:2, 2010, pp. 887–895.   
18 Bielecki, Janusz, “Energy Security: Is the Wolf at the Door?”, The Quarterly Review of Economics 
and Finance, 42:2, 2002, pp. 235–250.  
19 Noël, Pierre, “Beyond Dependence: How to Deal with Russian Gas”, European Council on 
Foreign Relations Policy Brief, 2008, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/93632/Beyond_Dependence_ 
1108.pdf (10/06/2020).  
Stefano Cabras 
8 
Europe’s dependency on Russian energy 
 
This section first discusses the extent to which EU dependency on Russian gas poses an 
actual threat to the EU’s security of gas supply. Second, it illustrates the evolution over 
time and the EU’s changing perception of its energy dependency on Russian gas.  
 
Energy dependency as a security threat  
 
Europe’s natural gas consumption has steadily increased until the mid-2000s. The 2008 
economic crisis dramatically reduced domestic demand, which has still only partially 
recovered. However, the parallel sharp decline in indigenous production, which has more 
than halved since the early 2000s, has offset the decrease in consumption. The combined 
effect of these dynamics has been an increase of Europe’s reliance on external gas 
supplies, which reached an all-time high of 89.5% in 2019 (see Figure 1).20  
 
Figure 1. EU countries’ dependency on gas imports  
 
 
Source: Eurostat  
 
                                                 
20 Eurostat, “Natural Gas Supply Statistics”, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Natural_gas_supply_statistics (20/12/2020).   
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Europe’s gas import profile is heavily concentrated. Two main suppliers  Russia and 
Norway  account for more than three quarters of natural gas.21 Germany, Italy and 
France account respectively for 19.7%, 15.9% and 11.9% of total EU external natural gas 
imports.22  
 
Russia is the leading gas supplier of the EU and in 2019 accounted for 44% of its natural 
gas imports.23 However, as Figure 2 demonstrates, Russia’s relative importance for EU 
members’ gas sectors varies, with Eastern EU countries being more dependent on Russian 
gas and having fewer alternative options.  
 
Figure 2: EU countries’ dependency on Russian gas 
 
Source: Author’s graph based on data from Eurostat. 
 
Russian gas flows to Europe through Gazprom, the state-owned Russian company that 
holds a monopoly over Russian gas exports. Critics argue that Gazprom’s total control 
                                                 
21 Eurostat, “EU imports of Energy Products – Recent Developments”, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/46126.pdf (2/12/2020).  
22 Ibid. 











over export pipelines is a potential tool for political blackmail24 and that gas exports are 
used to further the political agenda of the Russian government.25 The debates about 
Europe’s overreliance on Russian gas usually point to the vulnerability of some member 
states to Gazprom’s politically motivated supply disruptions and monopolistic pricing 
behaviour. The Russian company is accused of applying higher prices to Eastern 
European countries, with gas import price differentials within Europe depending both on 
the width of each EU country’s supply options and the status of their geopolitical 
relationship with Moscow.26 Whether or not Russia has actually been using its gas as a 
weapon by “reducing or cutting off supplies to European countries in order to force 
compliance with its political and strategic aims”,27 still sparks debates among experts.28  
 
Twelve EU member states receive more than half of their gas supplies from Russia. This 
alone can, however, give rise to misleading perceptions about Europe’s gas security, 
which is here defined as the “uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable 
price”.29 When assessing Europe’s gas security, different factors need to be taken into 
account. First, EU members that hold a bigger share of Russian gas in their supply portfolio 
– like the Baltic countries and Finland – are usually also those for whom gas plays a minor 
role in the energy mix (see Figure 2).30 Second, the growing role played by the European 
Commission in energy affairs during the 2000s needs to be considered.31 The EU has long 
lacked formal powers in this field. Eventually, the Treaty of Lisbon established energy as a 
shared competence. Between 1996 and 2009, the European Commission issued three 
different legislative packages, which significantly contributed to the integration of the 
                                                 
24 Petroleum Economist, “Russia: Gazprom's Export Monopoly Becomes Law”, 
https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/europe-eurasia/2006/russia-
gazproms-export-monopoly-becomes-law (5/12/2020).    
25 Aslund, Andres & Steven Fisher, “New Challenges and Dwindling Returns for Russia’s National 
Champions, Gazprom and Rosneft”, Atlantic Council, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-
depth-research-reports/report/new-challenges-and-dwindling-returns-for-russias-national-
champions-gazprom-and-rosneft (15/12/2020).  
26 Korteweg, Rem, “Energy as a Tool of Foreign Policy of Authoritarian States, in Particular Russia”, 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, 2018.  
27 Dickel, Ralf, “Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: Distinguishing Natural Gas 
Security from Geopolitics”, Paper, no. 92, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2014.  
28 Ibid.  
29 International Energy Agency, 2019, https://www.iea.org/areas-of-work/ensuring-energy-security 
(1/06/2020).  
30 Bros, Thierry, “A New Narrative for Gas”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2018. 
31 Herranz-Surrallés, Anna, “An Emerging EU Energy Diplomacy? Discursive Shifts, Enduring 
Practices”, Journal of European Public Policy, 23:9, 2016, pp. 1386-1405.   
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EU’s internal energy market and tackled key weaknesses of its energy profile, ultimately 
providing Central and Eastern Europe with access to lower, competitive prices set by 
market forces.  
 
The EU has gradually abolished destination clauses in supply contracts, which had limited 
the liquidity of the EU gas market by preventing buyers from reselling purchased gas 
outside their own market.  Gazprom has long been accused of imposing destination 
clauses in its supply contracts to keep its dominant position in Eastern Europe.32 In 2016, 
faced with a law suit filed by the Juncker Commission, the Russian company offered a set 
of commitments, including the abolishment of destination clauses, the enablement of 
interconnections to promote supply diversification and the increase of the frequency of 
price revisions.33    
 
The absence of direct physical connections between regions has also been addressed. 
Most intra-European pipelines have indeed been equipped with an East-to-West 
capacity, thus providing Central and Eastern European countries heavily dependent on 
Russian gas supplies with access to liquid gas hubs in Western Europe.34 In the last decade, 
infrastructure investments have also enhanced the inter-connectedness within and 
between countries, unlocking the isolation of regions previously dependent on a single 
supplier.  
 
Simultaneously, EU countries have taken measures to increase their supply diversification. 
The Trans-Anatolian Pipeline – operational since December 2020 – delivers around 10bcm 
of Azerbaijani gas to southern Italy, and new LNG terminals in Poland and Lithuania have 
provided these two countries with access to new supply sources.  
 
Overall, even in EU member states where it covers a large share of gas supply, Gazprom 
finds it increasingly difficult to display monopolistic behaviour or apply different tariffs 
                                                 
32 Loskot-Strachota, Agata & Georg Zachmann, “Rebalancing the EU-Russia-Ukraine Gas 
Relationship”, Bruegel Policy Contribution, 2014.  
33 Stern, Jonathan & Katja Yafimava, “The EU Competition Investigation of Gazprom's Sales in 
Central and Eastern Europe: A Detailed Analysis of the Commitments and the Way Forward”, 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2017. 
34 Harrison, Colin & Zuzana Princova, “A Quiet Gas Revolution in Central and Eastern Europe”, 




according to Moscow’s political agenda. Compared to a decade ago, the EU enjoys a 
stronger position vis-à-vis Gazprom, while Moscow’s ability to use gas as a geopolitical 
tool has significantly diminished.  
 
The evolution of EU-Russia energy relations 
 
The EU’s external energy policy is constrained by the broader geopolitical environment, 
by the diversity of its member states’ energy mixes, economic models and relations with 
Russia, as well as by the reluctance of European capitals to give up sovereignty on 
energy.  
 
The global geopolitical and geoeconomic context has frequently affected the EU’s 
bilateral relationship with Moscow. During the Cold War’s immediate aftermath, Europe’s 
relations with Moscow were influenced by the liberal, market-oriented paradigm which  
dominated global markets and promoted widespread liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization.35 In this context, and encouraged by the collaborative stance of Russian 
leaders, European policymakers were convinced that Moscow, in need of external 
economic and political support, could be integrated in the EU’s formal and informal 
networks of rules and norms.  
 
Energy rapidly moved to the forefront of economic cooperation with Moscow.36 The 
launch of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue in 2000 represented the apex of Europe’s liberal 
understanding of energy interdependence. Just like the European Coal and Steel 
Community in the 1950s, the dialogue was intended not only to secure energy supplies 
but also to serve as a springboard for political integration with Russia.37 The then 
Commission President Prodi acknowledged that “commitments achieved through this 
dialogue in the energy sector could serve as a model for other sectors”.38 Energy was to 
be “a steppingstone towards a wider partnership between the eastern and western 
halves of the European Continent”.39  
                                                 
35 Dannreuther, Roland, “EU-Russia Energy Relations in Context”, Geopolitics, 21:4, 2016, pp. 913-
921.  
36 Casier, op. cit., pp. 536–552.  
37 Talseth, Lars-Christian, The Politics of Power: The EU–Russia Energy Relations in the 21st Century, 
Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 2.  
38 European Commission, “Energy Dialogue with Russia ‒ Update on Progress”, 2002, p. 2. 
39 Ibid.  
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However, as the world entered the new millennium, it became gradually clear that the 
Western world had overestimated its capacity to expand the frontiers of the liberal 
order.40 The 2000s witnessed the rise of resource nationalism and a geopolitical approach 
to energy security through state-owned national oil and gas companies.41 Russia, on its 
part,  grew increasingly estranged from the Euro-Atlantic integration process and refused 
to embrace liberal political and economic norms in exchange for economic cooperation 
with Brussels.42  
 
In this context, the EU’s 2004 enlargement to new members highly skeptical of any 
engagement with Russia caused further tensions in the EU-Russia gas relationship. Certain 
Western European countries – particularly Germany, Italy and France – have a long history 
of commercial engagement with Russia dating back to the Cold War era. ENI, the Italian 
national oil and gas company, developed in the 1950s a parallel diplomacy, which rested 
on the support of international détente with the Soviet Union and an intense energy 
relationship with Moscow to diversify energy supply.43 Similarly, economic engagement 
and the expansion of Europe-Soviet energy relations was a distinctive feature of 
Germany’s détente44 and of the economic Ostpolitik promoted by German Chancellor 
Willy Brandt.45 After 1989 energy cooperation with Moscow has intensified, as witnessed 
by the establishment of various German-Russian energy joint ventures.46 French-Russian 
energy ties are less intense, due to the importance of domestically produced nuclear 
energy in France’s energy mix. However, energy trade with Russia allows Paris to further 
stress its political autonomy from the US.47   
 
                                                 
40 Ikenberry, John, “The End of Liberal International Order?”, International Affairs, 94:1, 2018, pp. 7-
23.   
41 Dannreuther, op. cit.  
42 Spetschinsky, Laetitia, “De la Maison Commune Européenne aux Espaces Communs Euro-Russes. 
Une idée au cœur des bouleversements de la scène européenne de 1985 à nos jours”, Journal of 
European Integration History, 11:1, 2005, pp. 61-81.  
43 Cantoni, Roberto, “Breach of Faith? Italian-Soviet Cold War Trading and ENI’s International Oil 
Scandal”, Quaestio Rossica, Ural Federal University, 2015, p.132. 
44 Högselius, Per, Red Gas: Russia and the Origins of European Energy Dependence, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
45 Graf, Rüdiger, Oil and Sovereignty: Petro-Knowledge and Energy Policy in the United States and 
Western Europe in the 1970s, New York: Berghahn Books, 2018, p. 259. 
46 Leonard, Mark & Nicu Popescu, “A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations”, European Council on 
Foreign Relations Policy Paper, 2007. 




France, Italy and Germany embrace a liberal view of energy interdependence with 
Moscow, which has long ensured uninterrupted cheap gas inflows coupled with high 
commercial predictability. Their gas relationship with Russia is fairly symmetric. Western 
European companies participate in profitable joint investments with Gazprom, offering 
access to capital and technology in exchange for long-term access to upstream gas 
production.48 Despite Russia’s role as an important gas provider, Western countries possess 
other supply options, and, most importantly, they provide Russia with large export 
markets.49  
 
Newer member states, particularly Poland and the Baltics, have an opposite – realist – 
view of energy interdependence with Russia.50 These member states have long lacked 
access to different competitive gas suppliers and their weight in Gazprom’s export profile 
is rather limited.51. Consequently, they perceive their dependency on Russian gas as a 
crucial strategic vulnerability which Moscow may exploit at any time.52 This East-West 
divide over Russia has deep historical roots ‒ linked to the harsh legacy of the Soviet 
domination ‒ and forms part of member states’ different visions of the broader EU-Russia 
political relationship.53 Anti-Russia sentiments are inherent in the Polish national identity.54 
The Baltic states, which have strong economic and cultural ties with Moscow, have grown 
increasingly fearful of Russian influence and expansionism via the Russian minorities in their 
countries and in the broader region.  
 
                                                 
48 Cameron, Fraser, “The Politics of EU‐Russia Energy Relations”, in EU–Russia Energy Relations, Talus, 
Kim & Piero Fratini (eds.), OGEL collection, Euroconfidential, Brussels, 2010, pp. 25-38. 
49 Smith, Keith, “Russia-Europe Energy Relations: Implications for U.S. Policy”, Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/100218_Smith_RussiaEuropeEnergy_Web.pdf 
(10/06/2020).  
50 Geden, Oliver, Clémence Marcelis & Andreas Maurer, “Perspectives for the European Union’s 
External Energy Policy: Discourse, Ideas and Interests in Germany, the UK, Poland and France”, 
Working Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2006, https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/External_KS_Energy_Policy__Dez_OG_.pdf 
(06/06/2020).  
51 Proedrou, Filippos, EU Energy Security in the Gas Sector: Evolving Dynamics, Policy Dilemmas and 
Prospects, Farnham: Ashgate, 2012.  
52 Shotter, James, “Poland Aims to Break Dependence on Russian Gas”, Financial Times, 2019, 
https://www.ft.com/content/d1b9d764-febd-11e8-aebf-99e208d3e521 (3/4/2020).  
53 Ibid.  
54 Kalan, Darius, “Poland’s New Populism”, Foreign Policy, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/ 
10/05/polands-new-populism-pis (2/02/2020).    
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The surge in hydrocarbon prices in the early 2000s emboldened the Russian economy, 
while also determining Moscow’s progressive loss of interest for closer alignment with EU 
policies. The EU’s support for the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s military 
operations in Yugoslavia as well as its enlargement and increasing involvement in the 
Eastern neighbourhood have been perceived in Moscow as a direct encroachment on 
its own sphere of influence. At the same time, Russia’s mishandling of the Chechnya crisis 
and its 2008 military operation in two Georgian secessionist provinces have undermined 
its credibility as a reliable partner for the EU.55 Within only two decades, Gorbachev’s 
ambitions of a ‘Common European House’ and Yeltsin’s commitments to reforming the 
Russian society and economy left room to increasing competition and mistrust between 
Russia and the West.56  
 
In this context, energy policy rapidly turned from an opportunity for cooperation to an 
additional source of tensions between Russia and the EU.57 A series of ‘gas crises’ 
damaged the energy relationship and triggered an intra-EU re-think.58 The January 2006 
clash between Ukraine and Russia over new terms for gas pricing and transit tariffs was 
solved after only 72 hours when gas supplies to Ukraine where reduced. After the 2006 
crisis, a Poland-led group of Eastern member states criticized the EU’s purely market-
based approach to energy security and started a campaign59 to stress the danger of 
relying disproportionately on Russian gas supply.60 In January 2009 a crisis erupted over 
the renewal of the transit contract caused a 13-days cut off of gas supplies to South-
Eastern European countries – most of them 100% dependent on Russian imports. Most 
importantly, it damaged Russia’s reputation as a reliable supplier61 and strengthened the 
EU’s resolve to decrease its dependency on Russian gas by finding alternative suppliers.  
                                                 
55 Ibid.    
56 Zhiznin, Stanislav, Energy Diplomacy – Russia and the World, Moscow: East Brook, 2007. 
 
58 Haukkala, Hiski, “From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a 
Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations”, Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies, 23:1, 2015, pp. 25-40.  
59 Hoffmann, Stephanie & Ueli Staeger, “Frame Contestation and Collective Securitisation: The 
Case of EU Energy Policy”, West European Politics, 42:2, 2019, pp. 323-345.   
60 Marcinkiewicz, Kazimierz, “Comment: Europe's Energy Musketeers Must Stand Together”, 
Financial Times, 2006, https://www.ft.com/content/fec8768c-999c-11da-a8c3-0000779e2340 
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Against this backdrop, the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea and the shooting of the 
Malaysian Airways flight MH17, followed by President Putin’s letter to 18 European heads 
of state threatening to stop gas supply to Ukraine, were the straw that broke the camel’s 
back. The leaders of the G7 countries plus the European Commission gathered in Brussels 
on 5 June 2014 and declared that  
the use of energy supplies as a means of political coercion or as a threat to security 
is unacceptable. The crisis in Ukraine makes plain that energy security must be at 
the center of our collective agenda and requires a step change to our approach 
to diversifying energy supplies.62  
 
The shock propelled energy security to the top of the political agenda.63 The Juncker 
Commission’s energy policy has conferred a geopolitical tinge to the EU-Russia gas 
relationship. This is reflected in the 2014 EU Energy Security Strategy which set the 
diversification of supply sources as a top priority of the EU’s external energy policy.64 The 
EU’s increasing wariness of its dependency on Moscow’s gas was also a main driver for 
the launch of the Energy Union in 2015. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk firstly proposed 
the Union in 2014, claiming that “excessive dependence on Russia makes Europe weak” 
and calling for Europe to take a unified stance vis-à-vis Russia to leverage its market 
power in negotiations and protect more energy vulnerable member states. In 2015, the 
Commission officially proposed the Energy Union. The document describes the EU’s 
excessive reliance on Russia gas as a strategic vulnerability and reiterates the importance 
of reducing its dependency on Russian gas.65 The 2016 LNG strategy also forms part of the 
EU’s efforts to diversify gas supply. It recognizes the potential for LNG to provide EU 
countries with alternative sources of gas and encourages investments in strategic LNG 
infrastructures.66 
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The Commission has also gained a greater say in the EU’s external energy affairs. The 2019 
revision of the EU’s Security of Gas Supply Regulation67 establishes that all 
intergovernmental agreements signed by member states and relevant for EU gas security 
are subject to an ex-ante check by the Commission to evaluate compliance with EU gas 
market rules. This measure provides Brussels with the authority to stop pipelines that run 
counter to the objectives of the internal energy market. The Communication on a 
European Green Deal of December 2019,68 while not focused on the security of gas 
supply, is relevant to the extent that it sets the tone of the EU’s energy policy for the years 
to come. In line with the overarching objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
demand reduction and decarbonization will be the main tools through which the EU will 
guarantee energy security in the next decade, with diversification of routes and suppliers 
as a less central objective.  
 
The US factor in EU-Russia energy relations 
 
The transatlantic divide over Russian gas, which has persisted until today, is a remarkable 
example of a clash between two different conceptualizations of energy 
interdependence. Since the Cold War, the Western European understanding of Europe-
Russia gas trade has been inspired by liberal theories, which posit that economic 
interdependence  fosters cooperation and prevents states from using force.69 
 
By contrast, the US views European energy affairs through a realist prism and sees gas as 
a tool through which Moscow projects its power over the continent, to the detriment of 
US influence in the region.70 American policymakers – during the Cold War and still today 
– claim that Russia uses gas as a strategic weapon to achieve political gains in Eurasia. 
Consequently, the US has repeatedly attempted, with mixed success, to leverage its 
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political and economic clout to influence Europe’s strategic energy supply choices, in 
order to limit Europe’s dependency on Russian hydrocarbons.  
 
This section illustrates the history of American attempts to influence the energy supply 
choices of European countries and explores the reasons behind the failures and 
successes of the US energy diplomacy in Europe.  
 
The first US diplomatic interference in European energy affairs was the Kennedy 
Administration’s unsuccessful attempt in the early 1960s to halt the conclusion of the 
Druzhba pipeline contract between West Germany and Moscow.71 Two decades later, 
the advent of President Reagan to the White House elevated energy security in Europe 
to a new level of concern in American foreign policy.72 In the 1970s, the exponential 
growth of Soviet gas supplies to Europe was observed with growing concern in 
Washington, also because gas revenues provided Moscow with crucial foreign exchange 
reserves that could be used to sustain its massive military expenditures.73  
 
The 1981 Brotherhood pipeline, designed to bring Siberian gas to Western Europe, was the 
object of a full-fledged diplomatic offensive by the Reagan Administration.74 The first US 
offer to supply West Germany with coal in lieu of natural gas was rejected, due to higher 
costs as well as technical and environmental concerns.75 Confronted with the failure of 
soft diplomacy, the US government imposed sanctions against the European and 
American companies involved in the construction of the pipeline76 and forbade US 
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companies to sell products and technology to Soviet producers involved in the 
construction of the pipeline.77 The Europeans vigorously opposed Reagan’s embargo and 
contested the extraterritoriality of US sanctions.78 The Brotherhood pipeline was officially 
inaugurated in France in 1984. The1980s witnessed the growth of a dense gas pipeline 
network connecting the Soviet Union and Western Europe.  
 
Since the 1990s, the US energy strategy in Europe has pursued two parallel objectives: to 
reduce Europe’s dependency on Russian gas and to enable energy-rich former Soviet 
countries to sell their gas abroad without having to rely on Russia.79 The Clinton 
Administration focused on the development of the Caspian Basin’s energy resources and 
leveraged its diplomatic and economic clout to build a network of pipelines pumping 
Azerbaijani and Turkmen gas towards Europe without traversing Russian territory. In many 
respects, the project served more geopolitical than commercial purposes.80 The initial 
plans to dip into Turkmen gas were abandoned in 2000, due to Ashgabat’s withdrawal 
from the project. The joint efforts from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, combined with 
the strong diplomatic and economic support of the Clinton and George W. Bush 
Administrations led to the inauguration of the smaller South Caucasus Pipeline in 2006, 
which departs from Azerbaijan.  
 
In the 2000s, the worsening of Europe-Russia relations, the gas crises and the mounting 
pressures of new member states pushed the EU to openly adopt the strategy of gas supply 
diversification long advocated by the US. The completion of the Southern Gas Corridor  
a gas supply route traversing Turkey and connecting Europe with the Caspian region  
became a central strategic objective of the Barroso Commission. The ambitious Nabucco 
pipeline, heavily sponsored by the US, was initially the centrepiece of the Commission’s 
plan to bring 31bcm of gas from Turkey’s Western border to Austria. However, the weak 
economic rationale,81 combined with the lack of EU internal cohesion – three German, 
Italian and French companies were participating in parallel in a Gazprom-sponsored 
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directly competing with Nabucco - ultimately determined the failure of the project. 
Eventually, the Commission downsized its ambitions and chose the shorter and cheaper 
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). TAP, which was completed in 2019, runs through Greece and 
Albania and under the Adriatic Sea into southern Italy to transport Azerbaijani gas to 
Europe.82  
 
This European pipelines game reveals that, under intense US pressure, the Commission 
abandoned its liberal market-oriented approach to actively engage in energy 
geopolitics and business decisions. Similarly, the more than decade-long transatlantic 
and intra-European quarrel over Nord Stream – the most recent pipeline project bringing 
Russian gas to Europe – exposes both intra-European divisions over gas supply security 
and the US pressures on the Europe-Russia energy relations.  
 
Nord Stream is composed of two pipelines (NS1 and NS2) with a total capacity of 110 
bcm that link Russia directly with Germany through the Baltic Sea. In its initial configuration 
in the early 2000s, Nord Stream carries a symbolic meaning that went beyond the mere 
economic rationale. During the opening ceremony in November 2011, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel described the project as a “milestone in energy cooperation” 
and the “basis of a reliable partnership” between Russia and Europe.83  In September 
2015, Gazprom and major European companies signed an agreement to double the 
capacity of Nord Stream, by adding a second line (NS2). While Poland was left virtually 
isolated in its opposition to NS1,84 the announcement of a second pipeline at a time where 
EU-Russia relations were at their lowest since the end of the Cold War, caused deep rifts 
within Europe and across the Atlantic. While the German government has been careful 
to describe NS2 as a commercial opportunity, Poland and the Baltic states have rejected 
this narrative and emphasized instead the geopolitical connotation of the project.85  
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The US, for its part, has fervently opposed NS2 since its inception. The Obama 
Administration stressed that NS2 would tighten Moscow’s grip on the European gas 
market and emphasized that the pipeline, which allows Russia to supply gas to Europe by 
bypassing Ukraine, would weaken Kiev both economically and politically.86 The advent 
of President Trump only hardened the US stance. On the eve of the 2018 NATO Summit, 
Trump called Germany a “captive of Russia”.87 Through the Countering America’s 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, approved in 2017, the US has imposed sanctions on 
Russia that affect both its energy sectors and its export pipelines, including NS2.88 After 
frequent warnings,89 sanctions were extended also to European companies involved in 
the project in December 2019, via the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act. American 
sanctions delayed the completion of the project but also alienated European allies. On 
17 October 2020, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas declared: “we decide on our 
energy policy and energy supply here in Europe” and added “I assume that Nord Stream 
2 will be finished. The question is when”.90 At this stage, it is difficult to imagine how a 10 billion 
project can be abandoned when just about 150 km of the pipeline remain to be installed in 
Danish and German waters.  
 
The impact of US LNG on global and European gas markets  
 
The effectiveness of US energy diplomacy in Europe has long been constrained by the 
fact that the US, being itself a net natural gas importer, failed to provide European allies 
with competitive alternatives to Moscow’s gas. In this context, the developments on the 
North American gas market over the last decade have dramatically altered pre-existing 
equilibria. Ground-breaking technological improvements in horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing techniques, coupled with a business environment characterized by 
                                                 
86 Ibid.  
87 Mason, Jeff, “Trump Lashes Germany over Gas Pipeline Deal, Calls it Russia's Captive”, Reuters, 
2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit- pipeline /trump-lashes-germany-over-gas-
pipeline-deal-calls-it-russias-captive-idUSKBN1K10VI (20/10/2020).  
88 Loskot-Strachota, Agata, Rafal Bajczuk & Szymon Kardas, “Nord Stream 2 Divides the West”, OSW 
Commentary, 273, 2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-06-
18/nord-stream-2-divides-west (10/10/2020).  
89 Koch, Moritz, Torsten Riecke & Klaus Stratmann, “How the US Could Halt Nord Stream”, 
Handelsblatt Today, 1/07/2019, https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/politics/secondary-us-
sanctions-how-the-us-could-halt-nord-stream-2/23834864.html?ticket=ST-4484433-
uOI4gBdCZWo7dDPilBWu-ap1 (10/10/2020).  
90 Afanasiev, Vladimir, “Maas Movement: German Foreign Minister Fires Back at US over Nord 
Stream 2”, upstream, 2020, https://www.upstreamonline.com/production/maas-movement-
german-foreign-minister-fires-back-at-us-over-nord-stream-2/2-1-895679 (20/11/2020).  
Stefano Cabras 
22 
the predominance of private surface land and sophisticated capital markets, have 
favoured a profound rise in US production of shale gas. Since the mid-2000s, US domestic 
natural gas production has almost doubled, registering the highest annual amount in 
2019, equal to 920.9bcm.91 Within only a few years, the US has therefore imposed itself as 
a major actor in the global gas landscape, surpassing Russia in 2011 to become the 
world’s largest natural gas producer, today accounting for almost a quarter of global gas 
production.92  
 
These dynamics led American policymakers and energy experts to claim that the US 
should embrace this new source of power to enhance its global leadership and promote 
its interests in international energy markets.93. Hochstein, special envoy for international 
energy affairs under President Obama, observed in 2019 that “the United States has 
transformed into the world’s energy superpower94“ and, on another occasion, suggested 
that a solution to the Ukrainian crisis could have involved the use of American LNG exports 
“to free the country from their dependencies”.95 
 
The Trump Administration replaced the concept of energy independence – at the heart 
US energy policy since Nixon – by energy dominance. Under this new doctrine, the US, 
freed from the vulnerabilities of import dependence, seeks to unleash energy resources 
on the world stage and benefit from increased exports, both politically and 
economically.96 The 2017 US National Security Strategy openly embraced the concept of 
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energy dominance and set the objective of using US energy resources to ensure that 
“allies and partners become more resilient against those that use energy to coerce”.97 
 
Unsurprisingly, Europe has been quickly identified as a natural destination for LNG so as to 
reduce its dependency on Russian gas.98 On the other side of the Atlantic, the European 
Commission 2016 LNG strategy openly recognizes LNG as a tool to end the dependency 
of certain member states on one gas supply source.99 Notably, in a joint statement of July 
2018, then Commission President Juncker and President Trump agreed to strengthen EU-
US energy strategic cooperation and the EU committed to import more LNG from the US 
“to diversify and render its energy supply more secure”.100 
 
However, the biggest impact of the US shale revolution on the European gas market so 
far has happened without US LNG reaching the European shores. The dramatic surge in 
US domestic gas production in 2008-2009 redirected LNG previously reserved for the 
American market to Asia and Europe. In Europe, where gas demand was weak due to 
the economic recession, new LNG generated oversupply and caused a considerable 
drop in spot gas prices. The US-generated global gas glut weakened Gazprom’s position 
in the European market and its market share declined from 30% before the crisis to 23% in 
2010.101 Under the pressures of its European customers, Gazprom reviewed gas supply 
contracts with around 40 clients in the period 2009-2015, providing for the introduction of 
spot components,102 the easing of take-or-pay obligations and price discounts.103 The 
price of Russian gas fell on average by 25% compared to pre-crisis levels.104  
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The process of liberalization of the EU market and international gas markets dynamics also 
played a role into the above-mentioned processes. However, it is undoubted that the US 
domestic surge in production has acted both as a multiplier and as an accelerator.   
 
The indirect impact that the shale revolution had on the European market says little about 
the effective capacity of US LNG to displace Russian gas sales in Europe. In fact, Gazprom 
has proved capable of adapting its pricing strategy and its market share rose to a record 
high of 36.7% in 2018.105 American LNG can compete only for the part of the European 
market that is not covered by Gazprom’s portfolio of long-term gas supply contracts and 
for volumes above take-or-pay minimal contractual quantities.106 In this segment, which 
equals around 50% of the EU market, competition is based on price. As shown in Figure 3, 
US LNG tends to be competitive with Russian gas in terms of short-run marginal costs 
(SRMC). US long-run marginal costs (LRMC) tend instead to be considerably higher.  
 
Figure 3: SRMC and LRMC of Russian pipeline gas and US LNG supplies to Europe 
 
Source: Boersma & Mitrova, op. cit., p. 32. 
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As acknowledged by several experts, the costs of US LNG has become a proxy for the 
marginal costs of LNG in Europe and increasingly act as a ceiling for the European gas 
spot price. Gazprom adapts to US LNG prices while not encouraging the development of 
new LNG projects that would bring more competition in the long term.107 
 
Moreover, US LNG exports introduced a set of radical innovations to the LNG industry with 
an impact on the geopolitics of natural gas.108 Traditional LNG projects were 
characterized by long-term oil-linked off-take contracts of usually 20 years,109 with 
destination clauses preventing buyers from reselling LNG to a third party. US LNG contracts 
are instead free of destination clauses and provide buyers with liquefaction services in 
exchange of a fee, which is independent of the actual purchase of gas.  
 
Since late 2018, when the Asian price premium disappeared,110 Europe has gradually 
become the main destination for US exports, which in the first semester of 2020 constituted 
9.2% of extra-EU gas imports, while Russia’s share of total EU imports has declined to 39.3%, 
compared to 44.7% in 2019. In the same period, the US has supplanted Qatar as the 4th 
main exporter of natural gas to the EU, with a share of 6.7%.111 The mere possibility to 
import more US LNG gives European purchasers leverage in negotiations with Gazprom 
and allows them to obtain better prices for contracted gas above take-or-pay levels.112 
Building its first LNG terminal in Klaipeda, Lithuania obtained the possibility to import non-
Russian gas, notably American, for the first time in history. Six months before the terminal’s 
completion, Gazprom allowed for a significant price discount in the new long-term supply 
contract with the Baltic country. While global gas markets conditions have certainly 
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contributed to this outcome, the role played by potential American LNG imports in 
strengthening Lithuania’s bargaining position should not be underestimated.113 
 
Poland is so far the only EU country that declared its intention not to renew the gas supply 
contract with Gazprom ‒ set to expire in 2022 ‒ and to fill the gap with Norwegian gas 
and US LNG.114 This threat might constitute both a negotiating strategy to obtain a lower 
price in the next contract with Gazprom and an attempt to emphasize the Polish 
closeness to the US. There is little economic rationale in this choice, as it implies higher 
supply costs for the state-controlled energy company PGNiG.115 
 
Overall, US LNG has strengthened the EU security of gas supply and affected the EU-Russia 
energy relationship through market-based, supply/demand dynamics. However, one 
should be careful to assume that LNG trade can be leveraged by US and EU policymakers 
to expel Russia from Europe’s gas market. So far, the amount of US LNG export to Europe 
has depended more on price differentials between Europe and the US and between 
Europe and other markets than on a deliberate transatlantic political strategy. Increasing 
exports can indeed be explained by abundant supply and a shrinking gap between 
Asian and EU gas prices.  
 
In terms of total costs, US LNG suppliers tend to be on the high end of the global supply 
curve,116 meaning that they will suffer the most from a prolonged low-price environment. 
McKinsey predicts that only 10% of the proposed LNG export terminals will be effectively 
built, due to increasing competition and low gas prices.117  Already during the 2019-2020 
winter, many US cargoes directed to Europe sold LNG at a cost that was very close to 
their operational costs. In light of this, it seems reasonable to assume that US LNG, rather 
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than flooding the EU gas market, will continue to constitute an important marginal source 
of gas supply for the EU, which will increase or decrease according to market conditions.  
 
This development has important implications for what US energy diplomacy can achieve 
in Europe and what the EU can gain from gas trade with the US. US LNG has created a 
situation of oversupply, where sellers compete for market shares offering the most 
competitive price. In Europe, Gazprom is no longer a price-setter and needs to adjust to 
market conditions. Moreover, the innovative features introduced by US LNG in the gas 
market allow European buyers to increasingly find gas available on the spot, whenever 
they need it. This commodification of the LNG market, coupled with the legislative action 
of the European Commission and the investments in gas infrastructures, have significantly 
strengthened the position of EU gas buyers vis-à-vis Gazprom. 
 
Such a gas landscape is becoming less and less amenable to grand strategies aimed at 
achieving geopolitical objectives. Gas transactions respond to supply and demand 
dynamics and LNG is sold on the spot to those who can pay the higher price. 
Consequently, Gazprom’s ability to ‘weaponize’ gas supplies to achieve geopolitical 
goals is seriously constrained. However, for the very same reasons, US LNG exports also 
respond to the logic of the market rather than to the foreign policy ambitions of American 
and European policymakers. In this context, artificially leveraging US LNG to seriously 
undermine Russia’s position in the EU gas market is very complicated.  
 
Conclusion: US LNG has weakened Gazprom’s grip in Europe, but will it remain 
affordable and burnable?  
 
This paper examined how the American shale revolution and US LNG coming to Europe 
have reshaped the global gas industry and impacted the EU-Russia gas relationship.  
 
The worsening of Europe-Russia relations and the EU’s Eastern enlargement to new 
members strongly opposing economic and political engagement with Moscow have 
induced the EU to question its gas dependency on Russia. In Europe, liberal views saw gas 
trade with Russia as a bridge capable of defusing strategic tensions with Moscow have 
given way to a more disenchanted and realist attitude, whereby the gas dependency 
on Russia is increasingly seen as an economic and strategic vulnerability. Since the mid-
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2000s, the EU has made diversification of supplier countries and routes a core element of 
its external energy policy and has found itself engaging in pipeline geopolitics.  
 
Washington ‒ a long-term advocate of Europe’s diversification of gas supply away from 
Russian gas ‒ has favourably welcomed the EU’s rethinking. Against this backdrop, the 
emergence of the US as a major natural gas producer and exporter has led to the 
conviction, on both sides of the Atlantic, that transatlantic gas trade would be mutually 
beneficial, providing American LNG players with a large export market and EU buyers 
with an additional and reliable source of gas supply. US LNG export, supported by an 
enabling economic and political environment, thus played a role in weakening 
Gazprom’s grip on the EU gas market. Moreover, US gas has changed the well-established 
rules of the gas business, turning LNG into a commodity that is increasingly traded through 
short-term arrangements and responds to price incentives.   
 
In this depoliticized gas market, where different suppliers compete for a market share, 
transatlantic grand schemes to leverage LNG and use it as a strategic weapon to 
weaken Russia’s influence in Europe risk to fail when confronted with market reality. EU 
buyers, with very rare exceptions, make their purchasing decisions mainly taking into 
account the competitiveness of alternative supply options.  
 
These developments have significant implications for the EU and its external energy 
strategy. Confronted with an increasingly realist energy environment, the EU has 
throughout the 2000s with mixed success supplemented its liberal toolkit with realist 
diplomacy to secure its gas supply, and it has increasingly treated gas trade as a 
geopolitical rather than a market issue. Today, as the market for LNG becomes more 
liquid, transparent and efficient and gas is increasingly traded as a normal commodity, 
pipeline geopolitics is no longer needed to secure gas supply. In this competitive and 
efficient market, the amount of gas purchased from American and Russian suppliers118 
depends on the supply choices of European buyers. Consequently, the EU can finally fully 
adhere to its liberal credo in energy affairs and the Commission can limit itself to play an 
oversight role, without interfering in business decisions.   
 
                                                 
118 Other suppliers are not mentioned here since the competition comes down to LNG vs Russian 
pipeline gas. The other pipeline import sources are effectively at capacity (see Henderson, 2019, 
op. cit.). 
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It is reasonable to expect that European state-owned energy companies are 
encouraged by their governments to include limited quantities of US gas in their supply 
portfolio, if only as a sign of goodwill vis-à-vis the United States. However, American 
attempts to ‘weaponize’ LNG risk to backfire and US political pressures to buy more US 
LNG risk to be perceived in European capitals as the pursuit of domestic political and 
economic agendas rather than a sign of the sincere desire to contribute to Europe’s 
energy security.  
 
Moreover, the future US LNG exports to Europe will depend as much on the affordability 
of gas molecules as on its compatibility with climate policies and objectives. EU member 
states have recently endorsed the Commission objective of cutting EU emissions by 55% 
by 2030, thus strengthening the credibility of the climate neutrality objective by 2050. 
While it is difficult to foresee the extent to which natural gas can play a role in 
implementing the European Green Deal, most studies agree that gas demand in the EU 
should remain stable or slightly decline until 2030.119 In the power sector, gas suffers from 
the increasing competitiveness of onshore wind and solar energy and expectations of a 
‘golden age’ for natural gas have been largely revised downwards. The fact that the 
Commission has recently announced120 that gas projects will no longer be eligible for EU 
support under the Trans-European Networks for Energy regulation indicates that gas will 
not be central in the EU’s decarbonization strategy.  
 
The Trump Administration had scrapped the Obama-era regulations on methane leaks. 
Methane emissions caused by US fracked gas are already drawing intense scrutiny within 
Europe, and the EU is considering imposing methane emissions standards for LNG. EU 
buyers have shown they are no longer willing to turn a blind eye on high levels of flaring 
and venting in US gas fields. Engie – the French energy company – has recently turned 
down a proposed $7b deal with a US LNG supplier over methane leakage concerns 
associated with gas production. Ireland’s government has recently declared that new 
LNG import terminals are not compatible with the country’s carbon neutrality strategy 
                                                 
119 Cătuţi, Mihnea, Christian Egenhofer & Milan Elkerbout, “The Future of Gas in Europe: Review of 
Recent Studies on the Future of Gas”, CEPS Research Report, https://www.ceps.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/RR2019-03_Future-of-gas-in-Europe.pdf (10/12/2020). 
120 European Commission, “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 





and withdrew support for the planned expansion of the Shannon LNG import terminal.121 
The political climate seems to be similar in Germany, where UNIPER gave up on plans to 
build a new LNG terminal.122 
 
To restore the credibility of US LNG exports, the Biden Administration will need to take the 
issue of methane emissions very seriously. Imposing new aggressive limits on methane 
pollution for gas operations is one of Biden key climate pledges. While this measure was 
intended to meet mainly domestic demands, it has now become central in transatlantic 
gas trade. A stronger focus on climate objectives in Europe and in the US suggests that in 
the next decade the main challenge in the gas market will be for gas suppliers to remain 
affordable and ‘burnable’. Abundant supply, weak demand and the increasing 
competitiveness of renewable substitutes all risk to seriously undermine the geopolitical 
ambitions of those who still seek to use gas as a strategic weapon.  
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